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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JULIE HARMON, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 920463-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
Appendix 1 to this brief contains a copy of Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-7-18, the only statutory provision specifically discussed 
in this reply brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For a reason different from the State's, Ms. Harmon agrees 
with the State that this Court need not rest the decision of this 
case on the pretext doctrine. This Court can dispose of the case 
with a simple holding that the search was conducted pursuant to 
involuntary consent. Should this Court choose to reach the legality 
of the initial traffic stop, the State cannot meet its burden to 
justify Detective Russo's conduct under either the pretext doctrine 
or the scope analysis championed by Judge Russon in his concurring 
and dissenting opinion in State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
CONSENT DOES NOT SATISFY THE STATE'S BURDEN 
TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MS. HARMON. 
A. All the Facts and Circumstances are in Issue. 
The State begins its consent analysis by arguing that 
"[o]nly the home search is in issue."1 The argument is apparently 
designed to give the State the appearance of consistency in the 
State's varied positions concerning whether or not the pretext 
1. The State argues, 
As a preliminary matter, the scope of this 
appeal must be understood. Defendant's 
plea-supported conviction is only for possession 
of methamphetamine — contraband that was found 
upon the search of her home. The charge of 
unlawful possession of prescription medications, 
arising from the earlier, incident-to-arrest 
search of defendant's purse, was dismissed 
following the preliminary hearing (R. 7, 365). 
Therefore, the question of the propriety of 
the search conducted incident to defendant's 
arrest has no direct bearing upon the parties' 
respective rights regarding defendant's 
conviction. Therefore, the question is moot, see 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 
1989), and under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (mootness), this Court ought not to 
review it. 
Because the search incident to defendant's 
arrest is a moot question, the State's 
acknowledgment that pretext doctrine may have a 
place in the arrest context (Opening Br. of 
Appellant at 11 n.2) is less significant to this 
case than it might otherwise be. This is because 
any possible misuse of misdemeanor arrest power 
here did not directly yield evidence that might 
be subject to the exclusionary rule under search 
and seizure law. Only the subsequent home search 
yielded such evidence. 
Brief of Appellee at 11-12. 
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doctrine applies in the case of a warrantless arrest.2 To the 
extent that the State's argument may be interpreted as contending 
that the facts prior to the search of Ms. Harmon's home are not 
relevant, the argument is mistaken. The evidence and argument 
presented by both parties in the trial court, and the trial court's 
memorandum decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law 
properly encompassed all the facts and circumstances involved in the 
entire encounter between Ms. Harmon and Detective Russo (R. 30, 
65-11, 79-92, 104-109, 196-309, 126-193). Ms. Harmon properly 
entered a Sery plea reserving her right to appellate review of the 
trial court's entire disposition of her motion to suppress (R. 95). 
This Court should reject the State's efforts to limit the 
relevant facts of this case. See e.g. State v. Lopez# 831 P.2d 1040 
(Utah App. 1992)(reviewing "the underlying facts" "in detail," 
including the officer's encounters with Mr. Lopez that occurred 
weeks prior to the traffic stop at issue on appeal). 
B. The State Does Not Carry Its Burden to Show Voluntary and 
Untainted Consent. 
1. The consent was not voluntary. 
Without citing any authority for the surprising 
proposition, the State argues that the burden to prove the 
voluntariness of Ms. Harmon's consent was on the State in the trial 
court, but that the burden shifts to Ms. Harmon to disprove the 
2. Compare brief of Appellee at 11-12 with brief of 
Appellee at 23 and n.6, and at 33-40, and with reply brief of 
Appellee in State v. Lopez, Case No. 900484-CA, at 5. 
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voluntariness of her consent on appeal because the trial court sided 
with the State in the trial court. Brief of Appellee at 13. The 
State is mistaken. It is the State's burden to justify warrantless 
searches in the trial court, and the State's burden remains with the 
State on appeal. See e.g. State v. Thurmanf 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 
23 (Utah 1993). 
In addressing the merits of the voluntariness issue, the 
State condenses many factors to be assessed into two — whether the 
consent was clear and specific.3 If adopted by this Court, the 
State's compression of the analysis would omit critical factors 
such as whether the State presents convincing evidence on appeal 
that the consent was not only clear and specific, but also 
3. The State argues, 
In Webb, this Court listed three factors for 
determining voluntary search consent: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely 
and intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
790 P.2d at 82 (quotations and citations 
omitted). The third factor actually describes 
the State's trial court burden, and otherwise 
repeats the first factor, regarding "clear and 
"specific" evidence supporting voluntariness. 
The State therefore addresses the first and third 
Webb factors together. 
Brief of Appellee at 13-14. The State then focuses exclusively on 
whether the consent was clear and specific. Id. at 14. 
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unequivocal, knowingly qLven, and freely gn/t.Mi, 
In til I |ii I iii| I. hiil I. Iii i imscnt 1 IIIIIII |ii esoiil s r iocii iiiii I 
s p e c i f i c c o n s e n t , t h e S t a t e m i s t a k e n l y o m i t s t h e p r o b l e m a t i c 
l a n g u a g e i n t h e foim, I h*t r e f e r r i n g t n tin1 " r i g h t s " " p e r Mi randa" 
t o have a s e a r c h Wil.hhul «ii i i iihl I I i r h i s i I . nnsenl I ,i„, 
w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h . Compare Appendix 3 o t A p p e l l a n t ' s o p e n i n g b r i e f 
w i t h ^ppc?11'pp " In i f f ill I'll Accord ing t o D e t e c t i v e P u s s o , he 
i n fo rmed Ms,, HIIIUIMI o t l iar Mirandd ijcjl'ils li*'lmt> line plr-u.Hi.1 I i"i in 
h i s p o l i c e c a r , .mil on 1 lit? way t o t h e j a i l b e f o r e t h e c o n s e n t {V 
207-r1 M|i mi In Miranda w.iinii i niq!«; have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e l i g h t t:o 
r e f u s e t o c o n s e n t t o w a r r a n t l e s s searches ," ' 1 ML. Il I iir IIIIIII IIIIIII 
of the form indicating that she waived hei rlcjhl to refuse a 
w ar r at,1 less seat •' • ' "lav. u| h n . informed "per 
Miranda" of thtiil i ighi niieieiuie does not provide convincing 
evidence of a clear, specific ox intelligent consent,, 
T h e S I i l l H i i ic i lk i» in Il i mi IIIIIII I  II in HI I II II in i o n s e n t W i t s I I I I M I M i v o i ' v i 1 , 
nor could it tw the record in this case, which Indicates that prior 
to giving the consent, Ms. Harmon twice refused to allow the 
warrantless search I In i IIm IIIH 
I ni iis<issuing t lie duress and coercion factor, the State 
c-pp^ i, fo show "My absenco of a claim of authority to search11 by 
Detective Russo at»«l "tin absence ecepl n m 
4# "Prior to any questioning., the person must be w ar i led 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
part by arguing# "Russo expressed no view toward defendant regarding 
whether a search warrant might be obtained when he first encountered 
her in her driveway and asked for search consent." Brief of 
Appellee at 15 (emphasis in original). While the State's 
representation is true, it is incomplete. Russo did in fact 
threaten to obtain a warrant. At the preliminary hearing, Russo 
testified that when Ms. Harmon initially refused to let him in her 
home, "I told her I'd have to come back with a warrant." (R. 349). 
At trial, he again stated, "I told her I would have to come back 
with a search warrant to get in if I didn't do it with her 
consent." (R. 245). At trial, he admitted that when he told her 
that he would have to come back with a warrant, he knew he could not 
obtain a warrant, but did not so inform Ms. Harmon (R. 224-227). 
Russo admitted in cross and re-cross examination that he told Ms. 
Harmon that he would have to get a warrant and warned her that it 
would be unpleasant if he had to resort to a warrant (R. 248-249) . 
He testified on direct examination that after Julie Harmon gave 
verbal consent to the search on the way to the jail, he told her 
that he would instead apply for a warrant (R. 209). The State's 
argument that Ms. Harmon's admissions on the way to the jail 
provided the probable cause so that Russo could have obtained a 
warrant does not address his threat to get a warrant before she made 
the admissions. More importantly, her admissions do not provide 
legal probable cause for a warrant because they are a fruit of the 
illegal search and seizure of Ms. Harmon. See e.g. United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984)(validity of issuance of search 
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warrant requires excising i l legal ly seized evidence from the search 
w.111 di il - i f f i d i" i * ) . 
While i t i s t r u e t h a t Russo denied h i n t i n g t h a t Ms, IUI i H 
could exchange he r freedom from a r r e s t for her consent to search , 
b . Appelli'i ' iJil I In lii • ii liiiil I iicliii i 11 mi in I I'd r 1 v i mn I in oil t h a t 
t h e pu rpor t ed a r r e s t for dxiv ing on suspension was being used by him 
as l eve rage tin ob t a in her consent to the search of t he house, Why 
e l s e did lie to I I I <uii -i I I •» ' «i i"i oi>\. \ nj hoi 1 i I1 • » < 7 1 1 sjispenfti mi 
that he knew that she had drugs in her house ami that it wc j.M be 
1 wore forced to resort to a warrant? (K. 743-251) 
Detective Russo1" s statement t o« M", H J I HI ..HI I hill 1 iji wuh. < on "ei'iip ,1 ! h*t 
he might appear coercive, brief of Appellee at 15-16, hardly 
d 1 spi m 'es, t h o II .MI "I I 11.. 1 11 In 1; 1 , II •  iiii ,) coercive. See State v . Webb, 
790 P , « (in nit «' i||.| , 1" 1." 1 riuj 1 f""((i.e governmeni' mi&t prove comment 
was give without duress or coercion, express or 
WhiJ t s arguable m a 4 , ***• Harmon #s consent w*^ 
obtained 1 * xhibiti - • - = f Appellee at 
given 1 in 1 Test* 5 
Harmon for dr ; -. ing on suspension, conlisu-reu her money diifl 
apparently illoqal prescription drugs, handcuffed her, threatened t c: 
g e t a warran t and inent IMIHMI Uhil liiiil i»Ap< I in in I I'M iillllill lie 
u n p l e a s a n t , JIH.I drove her toward the j a i l , if i s equa l ly a rguab le 
mil ir 1  in 1  it mi 11 IF» f'-r 1  IIi« 1'inii i«,i is ob ta ined f.*y in e x h i b i t i o n of f o r c e , un t h e s e 
f a c t s , t h e S t a t e does not meet i t s burden preset 11 11 si 1 tit in 1 
ev idence t o overcome the presumption a g a i n s t the? waiver of Ms. 
Harmon's rights. 
The State's arguments that after the arrest, Russo's 
conduct was "even less than a mere request" to search, and that Ms. 
Harmon was cooperative in "spontaneously proffering her consent" 
brief of Appellee at 17, are mere conclusions that are not and 
cannot be supported with accurate and complete citations to the 
record. In these circumstances, the State has failed to carry its 
burden. 
The State's final argument going to duress and coercion, 
that the consent form goes beyond current constitutional 
requirements in informing Ms. Harmon of her right to refuse to 
consent to the warrantless search, brief of Appellee at 17, again 
overlooks how the consent form confused the Miranda warnings with an 
informed waiver of Ms. Harmon's right to refuse a warrantless search 
of her home. See Appendix 3 to opening brief of Appellant. 
Had there been no taint from Detective Russo's illegal 
conduct, the State could not meet its burden on appeal to 
demonstrate convincing proof of voluntary consent. Particularly 
because of Detective Russo's illegal conduct, discussed infra, the 
State fails to meet the higher burden of proof of voluntariness. 
See e.g. State v. Robinson and Towers, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 
1990)("[A] prosecutor attempting to prove voluntary consent after 
illegal police action 'has a much heavier burden to satisfy than 
when proving consent to search' which does not follow police 
misconduct.")(citations omitted). 
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2m T h e consent was not obtained by means distinguishable from 
Detective Russo/s illegal conduct. 
in seeking to demonstrate that Ms, Harmon's consent war 
obtained by means dist; J I.IJU . \ h.tl h Ir.m l>*>1 *>nt ivc Russ"'f:. misconduct, 
the State relies on portions of State v, Thurman, 203 i l.il nl 
ii'i i| 11 r, 111 HTHM i Brief of Appellee at l/-tM t\ complete and 
accurate application ot Thurman deittoii;sf ! al «\» M M I t tnj State cannot 
meet Its burden tu prov<* untainted consent to justify Detective 
K l J K b J I ' '•! 1 "ill Jf]lHJII III 1 
In Thurman, t h e coin t 1)L-')JJI |i , i i im HJ • inn i i in. ' " t n t e ' s 
I'.nrdon to prove that consent is nut tainted by preceding 
in i i eii-i i in t J e\ mi i i i H u s i in i mi hi n n e r a n l p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
The principle underlying the exploitation test is 
that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law 
enforcement "to ratify their own illegal conduct 
by merely obtaining a consent after the 
illegality has occurred." Arroyo, 796 P.2a 
689. Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the 
police from engaging in illegal conduct even 
though that conduct may be followed by a 
voluntary consent to the subsequent search. 
The deterrence rationale discussed in Arroyo 
is grounded in the United States Supreme Court'^ 
decision in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975). There, Justice Powell, in a concurring 
opinion joined by now Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
made it clear that the analysis used to 
invalidate consent on the basis of exploitation 
was grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes of 
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12. Justice 
Powell's admonition that the exploitation 
analysis "always should be conducted with the 
deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule sharply in focus," .id. at 612, 
has become a cornerstone of search and seizure 
j urisprudence. 
t a j 1 ^ v . Rep. at 21 (citations omitted). 
The State correctly states the relevant factors to be 
considered in the analysis: "'the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct,' the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and 
the consent, and 'the presence of intervening circumstances,'" 
Thurman at 21, quoted in brief of Appellee at 18, Because the State 
apparently fails to appreciate the importance of the deterrence 
rationale in Thurman, the State's application of the factors is 
incorrect. 
In discussing the "purpose and flagrancy" factors, the 
Thurman court emphasized the operant policy considerations, stating, 
The "purpose and flagrancy" factor directly 
relates to the deterrent value of suppression. 
As Justice Powell noted in Brown, "The deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily 
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right." Thus, if 
the police had no "purpose in engaging in the 
misconduct — for example if the illegality arose 
because we later invalidated a statute on which 
the police had relied in good faith — 
suppression would have no deterrent value. At 
the other extreme, if the purpose of the 
misconduct was to achieve the consent, 
suppression of the resulting evidence clearly 
will have a deterrent effect and further analysis 
rarely will be required. Similarly, if the 
misconduct is flagrantly abusive, there is a 
greater likelihood that the police engaged in the 
conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives, 
and suppressing the resulting evidence will have 
a greater likelihood of deterring similar 
misconduct in the future. 
Thurman at 21-22 (citations omitted). 
In its analysis of the purpose and flagrancy factors, the 
State argues that Detective Russo initially had a purpose to 
investigate Ms. Harmon's drug possession, an "interest" that was 
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sustained throughout the entire scenario, but that he really acted 
on a valid "new purpose" to enforce the traffic code. Brief of 
Appellee at 18. The problem with the argument is that Russo never 
did enforce the traffic code; Ms. Harmon was never cited for or 
charged with driving on suspension. A correct application of 
Thurman demonstrates that when Detective Russo arrested Ms. Harmon 
"for driving on suspension," his purpose was to achieve her consent 
to the warrantless search of her home. The arrest was a "pretext 
for collateral objectives," Thurman, supra, heightening the 
deterrent value of suppression in this case. See id. 
Contrary to the State's arguments at page 19 of Appellee's 
brief, Ms. Harmon has not distorted Detective Russo's allegations 
that Ms. Harmon was a rumored drug lord with all of the drugs in 
Columbia in her house (R. 348, 228), and Ms. Harmon has never 
contended that Russo was acting illegally in making these comments. 
Ms. Harmon has included these facts in her brief because they are 
relevant to demonstrate Detective Russo's intention from the outset 
of the encounter with Ms. Harmon. 
In arguing that the arrest was not flagrant misconduct, the 
State goes so far as to imply that at the time of the arrest, all 
police officers had a legal duty to arrest all violators of the 
traffic code,5 and that Detective Russo should have arrested Ms. 
5. The State argues, 
Because section 41-1-17 stated that officers 
shall make arrests for Motor Vehicle Act 
violations, Russo's discretion was legislatively 
directed against merely citing defendant for 
(footnote continues) 
-11-
Harmon for driving on suspension. Brief of Appellee at 20 and n.5. 
The State's argument fails to note the fact that Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-7-18, in effect at the time of the arrest, provided that 
Ms. Harmon's violation of the traffic code could be resolved by a 
citation. That section states, 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person 
into custody, any public official of any county 
or municipality charged with the enforcement of 
the law, and personnel employed at an inspection 
and checking station or port of entry under 
Section 27-12-19 may issue and deliver a citation 
requiring any person subject to arrest or 
prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction charge 
to appear at the court of the magistrate before 
whom the person should be taken pursuant to law 
if the person had been arrested." 
Russo had no legal duty to arrest Ms. Harmon. 
Russo's conduct was flagrant misconduct. The evidence in 
this case demonstrates that his arrest of Ms. Harmon for driving on 
suspension deviated from the normal course of issuing a citation, 
and conflicted with the presumptive policy in place at the jail at 
(footnote 5 continued) 
driving under suspension a class C misdemeanor. 
In the rewritten Motor Vehicle Act, 
effective in 1992, section 41-1-17 was replaced 
by Utah Code Ann. §§41-la-107, 41-3-105(8)(a) 
(Supp. 1992). Those provisions lack the 
mandatory "shall" arrest language of section 
41-1-17, applicable at the time of defendant's 
1991 arrest, except for certain offenses not 
appearing to include driving under suspension. 
It thus appears that the power to make an arrest 
for driving under suspension. It thus appears 
that the power to make an arrest for driving 
under suspension now falls within the permissive 
"may" language of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 (1990). 
Brief of Appellee at 20 and n.5 (emphasis in original). 
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the time of the arrest not to incarcerate those driving on 
suspension. Detective Russo in fact did not enforce the traffic 
code in this case, but was simply using the traffic arrest as a 
pretext to achieve his collateral objective, obtaining Ms. Harmon's 
consent to the warrantless search of her home. 
The State argues that Detective Russo's conduct was not 
flagrant and that deterrence would not be served by suppressing the 
evidence in this case because the Lopez decision was not yet 
published at the time of this arrest. Brief of Appellee at 21. At 
the time of the arrest, Detective Russo should have known better 
than to arrest Ms. Harmon and threaten her with the unpleasant 
prospect of his having to obtain a warrant in order to obtain her 
consent to search her home in order to investigate a confidential 
informant's tip that Ms. Harmon was involved in illegal drugs. See 
e.g. United States v. Lefkowitzf 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932)("An arrest 
may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.") ; State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)(condemning pretextual use of 
traffic stop to investigate driver). 
The State's argument concerning the temporal proximity 
factor is incomprehensible to counsel for Ms. Harmon.6 The State 
6. The entirety of the State's argument is as follows: 
Turning to temporal proximity of the arrest 
and the consent, this factor is less helpful in 
attenuation analysis here. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 
151 & n.19 (Time ranging form "brief 
conversation" to two hours not significant for 
attenuation). The time to travel some seventy to 
ninety blocks, in police custody (Opening Br. of 
Appellant at 6), does not, by itself, appear 
highly significant. 
Brief of Appellee at 21-22. 
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argues that Ms. Harmon's "spontaneous" offer of consent and the 
absence of flagrant police misconduct provide intervening 
circumstances sufficient to attenuate the consent from the illegal 
arrest. Brief of appellee at 22-23. 
Reference to Thurman is again helpful. In Thurman, the 
court explained the "temporal proximity" and "intervening 
circumstances" factors together in light of the deterrence theory 
underlying the taint analysis, stating, 
Courts should also consider the time that elapsed 
between the illegality and the giving of the 
consent and the presence or absence of 
intervening events that might be relevant to 
attenuation. The deterrence principle also 
underlies these factors. The deterrent value of 
suppressing evidence seized following police 
illegality is negligible where the subsequent 
consent to search is substantially separated 
either temporally or circumstantially from that 
illegality. As one commentator has noted, 
Where the chain between the challenged 
evidence and the primary illegality is 
long or the linkage can be shown only by 
"sophisticated argument," exclusion 
would seem inappropriate. In such a 
case it is highly unlikely that the 
police officers foresaw the challenged 
evidence as a probable product of their 
illegality; thus it could not have been 
a motivating force behind it. It 
follows that the threat of exclusion 
could not possibly operate as a 
deterrent in that situation. 
Id. at 22 (citations omitted). 
The court then explained how all of the attenuation factors 
are to be weighed, in light of the policy of deterring illegal 
police misconduct, stating, 
[T]he exploitation analysis requires a balancing 
of the relative egregiousness of the misconduct 
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against the time and circumstances that intervene 
before the consent is given. The nature and 
degree of the illegality will usually be 
inversely related to the effectiveness of time 
and intervening events to dissipate the presumed 
taint. Where the misconduct is extreme, we will 
require a clean break in the chain of events 
between the misconduct and the consent to find 
the consent valid. For example, Justice Powell 
in Brown suggested that, where it appears from 
the facts that the police purposely engaged in 
the conduct to induce a confession, an 
intervening consultation with counsel or 
presentation before a magistrate may be required 
before the taint can be removed. The same type 
of break should be required where the evidence 
shows that the police purposely engaged in 
conduct to induce a consent. Conversely, where 
it appears that the illegality arose as the 
result of negligence, the lapse of time between 
the misconduct and the consent and the presence 
of intervening events become less critical to the 
dissipation of the taint. 
Id. at 22 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, because Detective Russo performed the 
illegal arrest, not to enforce the traffic code, but in order to 
obtain Ms. Harmon's consent, Thurman requires the State to show a 
clean break in the chain of events between the illegality and the 
consent, equivalent to consultation with counsel or presentation 
before a magistrate. See id. The State cannot make any such 
showing on the facts of this case, wherein Ms. Harmon offered her 
consent, not spontaneously, but under the coercion of Detective 
Russo's illegal arrest and continuing pressure to allow him to 
search her home. 
Because the State did not meet its burdens to show 
voluntary and untainted consent, this Court should rule that the 
evidence seized in the warrantless searches must be suppressed. 
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II. 
MS. HARMONS ARREST WAS ILLEGAL UNDER EITHER 
THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE OR SCOPE ANALYSIS. 
In State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), the 
majority opinion maintained the validity of the pretext doctrine, 
while Judge Russon wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in 
which he explained that the pretext doctrine is unnecessary in most 
cases because the law requires the scope of an officer's conduct to 
be tailored to its legitimate purpose. This Court may resolve this 
case on the basis of scope analysis and need not address the pretext 
doctrine if the Court so chooses. 
A. The Scope of Detective Russo's Conduct was Illegal. 
Detective Russo's purported purpose was to enforce the 
traffic code prescribing driving on suspension. Rather than citing 
Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension, Detective Russo arrested her, 
handcuffed her, searched her and her belongings, and informed her 
that he knew that she had drugs in her house and that it would be 
unpleasant if he had to get a warrant to perform the search. After 
he obtained her consent to the search of her home and found 
incriminating evidence during the search of her home, he never 
charged her with a traffic offense. Because his conduct exceeded 
its proper scope, suppression is appropriate. See brief of 
Appellant at 16-19. The State has presented no argument to the 
contrary. 
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B. Detective Russo's Conduct Violated the Pretext Doctrine, 
In the event that this Court does choose to address the 
pretext doctrine here, the State's arguments concerning the doctrine 
are addressed seriatim. 
The State argues that State v. Cruzy 838 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 
1992), modifies Lopez pretext analysis, and renders consideration of 
Detective Russo's intent to investigate drugs irrelevant to the 
pretext analysis. Brief of Appellee at 24. While the State's 
quotations from Cruz are correct, the State's argument that Cruz 
modifies Lopez is not. The Cruz opinion simply quotes Lopez, and 
there is nothing in the Cruz opinion modifying Lopez. As noted in 
Judge Russon's concurring opinion, the discussion of the pretext 
doctrine in Cruz is dicta. 838 P.2d at 85. 
The State implies that under Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128 (1978), consideration of Detective Russo's subjective 
intent for assessment of his credibility is not necessary in this 
case because Ms. Harmon did not dispute that she was driving on 
suspension. Brief of Appellee at 25. The fact that Ms. Harmon was 
driving on suspension does not immunize Russo's credibility from 
scrutiny. The impeachment of his inconsistent testimony concerning 
the scope of the events that occurred between the arrest and the 
search (e.g. R. 223-224) was relevant to the legality of the entire 
transaction. The State's argument omits the portion of the Scott 
decision indicating that an officer's subjective intent is relevant 
not only in assessing his credibility, but also in determining 
whether suppression is the appropriate remedy. See Scott, 436 U.S. 
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at 139 n.13. See also State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 22 
(Utah 1993)(deterrence is most appropriate where police engage in 
"conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives."). As demonstrated 
supra, because Detective Russo arrested Ms. Harmon as a pretext for 
his collateral objective of obtaining her consent to conduct a 
warrantless search, suppression is appropriate in this case. 
The State argues that under Lopez , the pretext doctrine 
does not apply in this case because driving on suspension is not a 
minor offense, but is a major offense that presumptively should 
result in custodial arrests. Brief of appellee at 25-27. While it 
is true that suspension of driving privileges may reflect that the 
suspended driver has posed a danger to the public in the past, id., 
that is not always the case. For instance, here, Ms. Harmon 
indicated that her license was suspended because her friend was 
stopped while driving one of Ms. Harmon's uninsured vehicles. While 
driving on suspension is not an accidental offense, id., many 
traffic offenses are not accidental, and yet do not result in 
custodial arrests. Driving on suspension in this case was a mere 
malum prohibitum transgression, hardly comparing to the evils posed 
by one driving sixty miles an hour in a residential section. 
Compare the facts of this case with those in State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 
83, 85 (Utah App. 1992)(pretext doctrine inapplicable where 
defendant was stopped while speeding at sixty miles an hour in a 
residential section. 
The State's argument that Russo's conduct should be 
affirmed because driving on suspension is a serious offense misses 
the critical fact in this case: Russo never enforced the law 
prohibiting driving on suspension. While the traffic code's 
prohibition of driving on suspension is surely a legitimate and 
important law, it was not intended to be used as it was here, as a 
pretext to avoid the warrant requirement in coercing Ms. Harmon's 
consent to the search of her home. Whatever policy considerations 
underly the traffic code's prohibition of driving on suspension are 
not at issue in this case# where the detective was merely utilizing 
the traffic code pretextually to obtain Ms. Harmon's consent. 
The evidence presented to the trial court demonstrates that 
citation is the usual course of action taken by a police officer 
enforcing the prohibition against driving on suspension, unless the 
driver is intoxicated, and that at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, 
there was a presumptive no-booking policy in place at the jail for 
those arrested for driving on suspension (R. 233, 268-269, 
272-273). The State essentially concedes that the State did not 
meet its burden to demonstrate that a hypothetical reasonable 
officer would have arrested Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension, 
although the State omits the portion of the test concerning whether 
the hypothetical reasonable officer would have made the arrest in 
the absence of Detective Russo's pretextual motivation. Brief of 
appellee at 27-30. Rather than conceding that the proper 
application of the governing law requires suppression of the 
evidence, the State proposes that this Court should modify pretext 
analysis and adopt the State's standard, whereby evidence is 
suppressed only in cases wherein an officer's conduct is theretofore 
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"unheard of." Brief of Appellee at 28-29. The State's argument 
overlooks the doctrine of stare decisis# which calls for adherence 
to precedents set by this Court. See e.g. State v. Thurman, 203 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1993)(the "predictability of the law and 
the fairness of adjudication" require Courts to follow the Courts' 
own precedents) . Particularly in this case involving a custodial 
arrest for a misdemeanor traffic offense, the State's prior argument 
is more convincing than its present position. 
[T]he State's argument that this Court should 
abandon the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is 
directed only at traffic stops and does not 
extend to misdemeanor traffic arrests. The State 
shares defendant's concern that a misdemeanor 
traffic arrest could be misused by a police 
officer as a pretext to conduct a highly 
intrusive search of the arrested person and his 
or her vehicle without reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, or a warrant. While an officer 
appears to have the authority to arrest for a 
misdemeanor traffic violation under Utah law, 
that clearly is not the usual practice. 
Reply brief of Appellee in State v. Lopez, Case No. 900484-CA, at 5 
(footnote omitted). While it is true that the pretext doctrine is 
not always a boon to obtaining and maintaining criminal convictions, 
brief of Appellee at 29, it is important to the integrity of the 
courts and to insuring that police are not abusing their powers, 
discriminating in the enforcement of the laws, and trying to evade 
the warrant requirement. See State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 
1044-1046 (explaining rationales behind pretext doctrine). 
The State complains that Ms. Harmon failed to demonstrate 
that police officers usually used a driver's state of intoxication 
in deciding whether or not to make a warrantless misdemeanor traffic 
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arrest. Brief of appellee at 30. The State's argument 
misunderstands the burden of proof set forth in Lopez, "If the 
defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue, the burden of proof 
is then ultimately upon the State to show that a reasonable officer 
would have made the stop absent the alleged illegal motivation." 
831 P.2d 1040, 1049. 
C. This Court Should Not Abandon the Pretext Doctrine. 
The State criticizes the pretext doctrine, first arguing 
that the doctrine provides superfluous protection. Brief of 
Appellee at 30-33. There are frequently multiple legal approaches 
to one legal problem — in civil cases, parties may choose to 
address a problem through tort or contract law; in criminal cases, 
prosecutors frequently have many criminal charges from which to 
select in charging a case, and defendants frequently have multiple 
legal defenses attaching to one factual circumstance. The fact that 
scope analysis and pretext analysis may overlap in some cases is no 
reason to deprive the Courts of either doctrine. Search and seizure 
cases are by their nature fact sensitive, requiring versatile legal 
approaches• 
The State complains that the inquiry into an officer's 
subjective intent in the application of the pretext doctrine 
conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's requirement of 
objective analysis of Fourth Amendment issues. Brief of appellee at 
33-34. As noted in Appellant's opening brief at 20-23 and 
accompanying notes, the objectivity rule is of questionable legal 
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authority and is not consistently applied by the United States 
Supreme Court. As trial counsel argued to the trial court (R. 
149-150), and as is fully discussed in Appellants opening brief at 
19-24, this Court should hold on the basis of the Utah Constitution 
that the subjective intent of the officers is one relevant fact for 
trial courts to consider in search and seizure cases. Evaluation of 
one's intent is a common legal concept in civil and criminal law, 
and there is always circumstantial evidence available to accomplish 
the task. Several Utah cases demonstrate that an officer's 
"subjective intent," "motivation," "objective" or "purpose" may be 
evaluated objectively in assessing all the relevant facts and 
circumstances in a given search and seizure case. See State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 27 (Utah 1993)(evaluating officers' 
purpose in violating no-knock statute, finding that the intent was 
self-protection, rather than to intentionally deprive Mr. Thurman of 
his rights); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985)(rejecting 
officer's claim of intent to perform inventory search when evidence 
suggestive investigative intent). 
The State's complaint that an objective pretext test is 
difficult to apply, brief of Appellee at 35-37, is not persuasive.7 
7. The State would be in a better position to complain 
about the confusing nature of the Courts' pretext doctrine, if the 
State could maintain some consistency in its own arguments 
concerning the applicability of the doctrine. Before this Court in 
Lopez, the State argued, fl[T]he State's argument that this Court 
should abandon the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is directed 
only at traffic stops and does not extend to misdemeanor traffic 
arrests. The State shares defendant's concern that a misdemeanor 
(footnote continues) 
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The State's formulation of the objective test excludes the relevant 
consideration of the officers' subjective intent, and thus, the 
State's complaint is directed at its own standard, rather than at 
the governing law defined in Lopez. Many people find all law to be 
conceptually difficult to work with, but this should not absolve our 
courts and attorneys from working hard to see that our system of 
government is functioning within constitutional bounds. 
The State argues that the pretext doctrine is inconsistent 
with the Utah Constitution's requirement of separation of government 
powers, because the police had a duty at the time of Ms. Harmon's 
arrest to arrest all traffic violators. Brief of Appellee at 38. 
As previously noted, at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, the police 
had no duty to arrest all traffic violators because Utah Code Ann. 
(footnote 7 continued) 
traffic arrest could be misused by a police officer as a pretext to 
conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested person and his or 
her vehicle without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a 
warrant." Reply brief of Appellee in State v. Lopez# Case No. 
900484-CA, at 5 (footnote omitted). While admitting to the State's 
concession in Lopez before this Court, the State indicates that in 
the Utah Supreme Court, the concession will be slightly modified, 
"On certiorari, the State will argue that pretext doctrine has no 
legitimate place in search and seizure law, at least in the context 
of non-arrest temporary detentions." Brief of Appellee at 9. The 
State apparently wishes to maintain an appearance of consistency, 
arguing that this case does not raise the question of a pretextual 
arrest because the evidence seized at the time of Ms. Harmon's 
arrest (prescription medication) was not encompassed in Ms. Harmon's 
guilty plea to possession of different evidence seized from her home 
(methamphetamine). Brief of Appellee at 12. The State then 
concedes that a pretextual arrest provides a more compelling case 
for the application of the pretext doctrine than does a traffic 
stop, brief of Appellee at 23, but later argues that the pretext 
doctrine should be abandoned altogether, or be "tightly ... 
restricted in application" to "highly unusual arrest[s] for [] 
obviously minor offense[s]," brief of Appellee at 30-40. 
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section 77-7-18 provided the option to resolve traffic violations 
with citations. More importantly, the pretext doctrine does not 
require courts and the police to "trump" the legislature by 
selecting which traffic laws should be enforced. The doctrine does 
not deprive the police of the opportunity to enforce any traffic 
laws; it forbids the police from manipulating the traffic laws to 
suit ulterior illegal ends, such as evasion of the warrant 
requirement and violation of principles guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. Ms. Harmon has never argued that Detective 
Russo should not have enforced the code's proscription of driving on 
suspension (which he never did); she has argued that the evidence he 
obtained without a warrant by arresting her for the misdemeanor 
traffic offense and otherwise coercing her consent should be 
suppressed. See State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Utah App. 
1992)("The pretext doctrine does not restrict the state legislature 
from enacting traffic regulations, nor does it facially invalidate 
any traffic regulation. Rather, the pretext doctrine restricts 
police discretion when used unconstitutionally."). 
The State argues that Ms. Harmon had no "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" in driving on suspension, and that she had 
"no constitutional right to be a 'scofflaw.'" Brief of Appellee at 
39. She did, however, have reasonable expectations of privacy in 
the legitimate scope of the misdemeanor traffic stop, and in her 
car, her person and her home, which were infringed by Detective 
Russo's pretextual conduct. Again, Ms. Harmon has never begrudged 
Russo's authority to issue a citation for her driving on suspension; 
her complaint is that he asserted but never enforced the traffic 
code in order to evade the warrant requirement. The State's 
argument concerning reasonable expectations of privacy overlooks the 
fact that the pretext doctrine is not based solely on Fourth 
Amendment/Article I section 14 premises. As the Lopez Court 
explained, the doctrine also serves legitimate interests in equal 
protection of the laws and in maintaining the integrity of the 
courts. See State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1045-1046 (Utah App. 
1992). 
CONCLUSION 
The State has failed to demonstrate that Detective Russo's 
conduct can be justified on the basis of Ms. Harmon's consent. This 
Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Ms. Harmon's motion 
to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
/! 
day of March, 1993. 
R. MOFI 
Attorney for Ms. Harmon 
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APPENDIX 1 
Statute 
TEXT OF STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-18 states: 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person 
into custody, any public official of any county 
or municipality charged with the enforcement of 
the law, and personnel employed at an inspection 
and checking station or port of entry under 
Section 27-12-19 may issue and deliver a citation 
requiring any person subject to arrest or 
prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction charge 
to appear at the court of the magistrate before 
whom the person should be taken pursuant to law 
if the person had been arrested." 
